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Abstract. Trust plays a critical role in communications, strength of relationships, 
and information processing at the individual and group level. Cognitive social 
simulations show promise in providing an experimental platform for the 
examination of social phenomena such as trust formation. This paper describes 
the initial attempts at representation of trust in a cognitive social simulation using 
reinforcement learning algorithms centered around a cooperative Public 
Commodity game within a dynamic social network. 
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1   Introduction 
One of the fundamental phenomena governing human interactions is the notion of 
trust, without which the fabric of society quickly comes unraveled. Trust in other 
humans and societal institutions facilitate a market economy and a democratic form of 
government. The human information processing system, adept at receiving and 
synthesizing large amounts of sensory information from our environment, manages to 
identify which percepts are salient to our current task or our long term well being by 
the allocation of selective attention [1]. In this view the level of trust is a quality 
associated with each percept either directly, one sees an event as a first person 
observer, or indirectly, the information comes from a reliable source. The latter case, 
involving the interaction and development of trust between individuals, will be the 
topic of this paper. The representation of trust within cognitive social simulations is of 
fundamental importance to the exploration of macro level social phenomena. 
When humans interact with one another there is a multitude of information, both 
verbal and nonverbal, that is exchanged between the participants. In social 
simulations the major issue in modeling this phenomenon is to understand more fully 
how information flows through a social network and how the society develops and 
evolves its beliefs over time [2]. Central to the modeling of information flow in social 
systems is the concept of trust. The main contribution of this paper is a model of trust 
based on reinforcement learning and demonstrated in the context of the Public 
Commodity Game [3].  
This paper first provides a brief introduction to trust, reinforcement learning, and 
cognitive social simulation. This is followed by a description of the general trust 
model as well as the current Python implementation of the model within the context 
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of the Public Commodity game. Computational results of experimentation with model 
parameters related to the formation of norms and penalties for the violation of norms 
are provided as well as a summary and discussion of future work.  
2   Background 
This section provides an overview of the notion of trust as used in this setting, 
reinforcement learning, and cognitive social simulation. 
2.1   Trust 
In order to model trust, it is first necessary to define trust. Trust is not a simple 
concept (though it is easy to express its general intent) and codifying trust to the 
extent of incorporation into computer simulation is rather difficult. This work 
establishes a definition of trust suitable for use in simulation rather than a general 
definition. In particular the definition of trust used is chosen with an eye toward the 
long term goal of the research, to model communication and belief revision. Trust is 
viewed as an analysis performed by an individual agent to prejudice newly obtained 
information either based on the sender or the topic of discussion, and the history 
between the sender and the receiver and topic [4]. As an example, if a person who is 
completely trusted by another shares some information, the receiver is more likely to 
welcome the communication and take action on it. Additionally, if the sender is 
moderately trusted by the individual, but the receiver is untrusting of the topic (such 
as a particular political view), they may disregard the information as non-actionable. 
Simply making a binary decision of actionable versus non-actionable information is 
not robust enough to capture the nuances of human behavior requiring the 
incorporation of some concept of the grey area in between. The model incorporates 
sender and topic into the state space of a reinforcement learning algorithm to develop 
a two-pass notion of trust where the receiving agent first determines whether 
information is actionable then makes a separate decision if he should or should not 
revise his beliefs based on this new information.  
2.2   Reinforcement Learning 
An appealing approach to represent human like learning and action selection is the 
idea of reinforcement learning, where agents will seek select actions within their 
environment based on their experience. Based on the permissiveness of the 
environment, agents are eligible to receive percepts from the environment that inform 
them on the state of the environment at a given point in time. The basic elements of 
reinforcement learning are: a policy that maps states to actions; a reward function that 
maps a state of the environment to a reward; a value function that maps states to long 
term value given experience; and an optional model of the environment [5]. The 
policy provides a set of actions that are available in a given state of the environment; 
the agents leverage their prior knowledge of the environment, informed by the value 
function, to determine which action will provide the greatest reward, as defined by the 
modeler. Agents must strike a balance between exploration, behavior to explore the 
reward outcomes of state action pairs that have not been tried, and exploitation, 
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behavior that takes advantage of prior knowledge to maximize short term rewards, in 
order to avoid converging to local minima [5]. The ability to control this balance 
makes reinforcement learning an attractive approach for representing human 
behavior. The reinforcement learning technique used in this work is Q-learning in 
conjunction with a softmax function (the Boltzmann distribution). 
Q-learning, Q(s,a)←Q(s,a)+α(r+γmaxa'Q(s',a')-Q(s,a)), falls into a class of model 
free reinforcement learning methods that have the property that the learned action-
value function, Q, approximates the optimal action-value function, Q*, requiring only 
that all state action pairs be updated as visited [5]. For each state action pair, (s,a), the 
Q-learning function updates the current estimate based on new information received 
from recent actions, r, and discounted long term reward. In general, an action is 
selected from a given state, the reward outcome is observed and recorded, and the 
value function updated. The value associated with each action is used during each 
visit to a particular state to determine which action should be chosen using the 
Boltzmann distribution, shown below.  
 
 
  (1.1) 
 
 
The Boltzmann distribution uses the temperature term, τ, to control the level of 
exploration and exploitation. A high temperature translates into exploratory behavior, 
a low temperature results in greedy behavior. 
2.3   Cognitive Social Simulation 
Cognitive social simulations are particularly well-suited for defense applications 
which typically call for analysis of a military force’s performance while operating as 
part of a complex conflict ecosystem [6]. Agent based models have been applied to 
the military domain previously [7], but the use of cognitive social simulation, enabled 
by cognitive architectures, in this application area is relatively new [8]. The relevancy 
of these tools is particularly highlighted by the nature and objectives of the current 
conflicts, where the population of the conflict area is seen as the center of gravity of 
the operation [9]. Gaining an understanding of potential means of transitioning the 
social system in these countries from an unstable to a stable state provides a challenge 
to leaders at all levels of the military and civilian organizations involved. The 
representation of trust and its impact on the effectiveness of information operations is 
required in order to provide greater insight into the population within the area of 
interest. 
3   Approach 
This section provides an overview of a general model of learned trust for agents in 
cognitive social simulations, an introduction to the test bed environment, and a 
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3.1   General Model 
This general model is a turn-based simulation in which the agents and their 
relationships are represented by a single network graph with the agents as the nodes 
and their social relationships as the edges, weighted by the value of the relationship. 
To be specific the network graph is a combination of two similar graphs with identical 
nodes, but in one the edges are bidirectional and represent a base constant value and 
the second one in place of each bidirectional edge contains a pair of directed edges 
representing the agent’s individual variable contribution to the strength in the 
relationship. In this way, the edge weights have both a static and dynamic component. 
The static is based entirely on the concept of homophily (ܧு), that like persons 
associate more frequently, utilizing a simple Euclidean distance calculation and as 
stated above is set as a constant [10]. The dynamic portion is completely under the 
control of the agents involved (ܧ஺՜஻). In the case of k total agents, each agent has k-1 
choices of who to spend time with and based on that emphasis will receive some 
unknown reward from these relationships. For every simulation round, each agent will 
choose to increase, decrease or maintain their contribution to their relationships with 
the other agents. This contribution can be seen like a fraction of time spent with the 
others in that it is represented as a floating point number from 0.0 to 1.0 and such that 
the sum of all these components (i.e. the sum of all edge weights leaving the node 
representing the agent) always sums to 1.0. At the end of each turn the agent is 
rewarded based on the strength of their relationships. This reward takes the following 
form: 
                                           ܴ݁ݓܽݎ݀ ൌ ܧு · min (ܧ஺՜஻, ܧ஻՜஺)    (1) 
 
The equation uses the minimum of the variable contributions from each agent.  In this 
way it more accurately can be said that the variable portion is the fraction of time that 
the agent would like to spend with the other agent and therefore using the min also 
provides a small penalty for those who place more emphasis on a relationship than the 
recipient.  
The result of this basic model is the development of a simple dynamic social 
network. The network tends to become highly centralized around 1 or 2 agents.  In 
particular, in runs consisting of 50 agents, the final network graph consisted of nearly 
every agent with a strong connection to a single central agent with no other 
connections present.  In order to mitigate this affect it was necessary to add a second 
order factor in the reward calculation for the agents.  Continuing along the analogy 
that the emphasis represents a fraction of time desired to be spent with the other 
agents, then it is natural to extend this and allow for groups of more than 2 agents to 
spend time together.  In other words if two agents have a strong relationship and also 
each have a strong relationship to the same third agent, then all three agents should 
receive an additional reward for this.   
The second order reward factors are based on the same reward function as used in 
the first order above. In this case, the reward is divided by a distribution factor and 
subsequently squared. For the case of agents A and B as above, but this time having a 
common friend in agent C, the additionally reward looks as below: 
 
  2݊݀ െ ܴ݁ݓܽݎ݀ ൌ min( ܧு · min(ܧ஺՜஼, ܧ஼՜஺) , ܧு · min (ܧ஺՜஼, ܧ஼՜஺)) / ܦ        (2) 
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The closeness centrality of the network is highly sensitive to the distribution factor 
and is discussed in detail in section 4. 
Once the second order terms are added similar network properties to what we would 
expect to see in real social situations emerge; namely subdivisions into clique’s, 
pairings and the exclusion of certain individuals. It is obvious that this feature is not 
intended to actually model the internal and external processes that form human social 
networks; rather it is simply building the stage on which to build future work. 
3.2   Prototype Trust Implementation 
Each agent has a simple belief structure consisting of a finite set of beliefs, five in this 
case, represented by a single floating point number from 0.0 to 1.0.These beliefs 
combine in simple linear combinations to provide issue-stances, one in this case, also 
as a floating point from 0.0 to 1.0.  During each turn of the simulation, following an 
initial stabilization period, set initially to 1000 rounds for a simulation of 15 agents, 
the agent will choose a topic based on a probabilistic Boltzmann distribution, and 
discuss this topic with its k nearest neighbors. Other than the k nearest there any 
neighbor above a specified threshold will always receive a communication, while 
neighbors below another threshold will never receive a communication.  
Initially, the communications consist of each agent telling his closest neighbors 
what his value is on a selected belief. The receiving agents then use a reinforcement 
learning algorithm to determine whether or not belief revision is merited. In order to 
utilize reinforcement learning it is necessary to define some concept of a reward that 
the agent will receive based on their beliefs and therefore directly related to their trust 
and belief revision mechanisms. Our inspiration for a reward model comes from 
Game Theory and is called the Public Commodity Game [3]. In this game, each agent 
has an option to contribute to a public pot of money each round or to opt out. 
Following the round the money in the pot is multiplied by some amount (in this case 
3.0) and then redistributed to each agent regardless of contribution. As a slight 
variation of this, the agents are allowed to decide an amount to contribute rather than 
to choose from full or no contribution.  
In the current model, agents are given 1.0 possible units to play such that an agent 
that contributes nothing is guaranteed a reward of at least 1.0 for opting out and an 
unknown reward ranging from nearly 0 to 3.0 for full contribution. Game theory tells 
us that without cooperation the expected equilibrium for rational players would be 
exactly 0.0 contributions from all agents, in other words all agents take the guaranteed 
1.0 and opt-out of the public commodity all together [3]. It is likely the case that some 
people would always contribute at least some small amount irrespective of their 
losses. In order to achieve this, “Faith in the Public Commodity” is the issue-stance 
and is used to directly control the level of their contribution to the public commodity. 
During each simulation round, agents communicate with one another and attempt to 
bring other agents closer to their beliefs. Despite the fact that a 1.0 contribution from 
all agents is the most mutually beneficial strategy, it is not a stable equilibrium as a 
single person could quickly realize that decreasing their contribution will increase 
their total revenue and would be easily reinforced by learning algorithms. What is 
seen is the agents benefit the most from a strategy of trying to make all the other 
agents contribute at a level consistent with their issue strength. 
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Now that there is a concrete idea of reward in this model, it is possible to begin 
applying a simple model of belief revision. Essentially, the agent will use a 
reinforcement learning algorithm where the state space is represented by sender-topic 
pairs and the action will be to dismiss the communication or to apply a revision, based 
on their level of trust in the information, resulting in an update of the fraction of time 
they desire to spend with the sender. Without any further weighting factors or limiting 
algorithms, the expected result of this simulation is that the beliefs of all agents will 
approach a stable equilibrium in which all beliefs are the same.  
4   Experimentation and Analysis 
This section provides a comparison of model results from several attempts to 
moderate belief revision within the model.  
4.1   Experimentation of Second Order Factors in the Base Social Network 
The first task was to evaluate the effects of the strength of the second order terms in 
the base social network reward functions. The distribution factor was varied and 
showed a fairly steep “S” curve that was centered between D = 14 to D = 24.   
 
Fig. 1. Closeness centrality versus distribution factor 
The distribution factor in affect allows fine tuning of closeness centrality in the 
base model in order to fit it to any particular purpose. There are several widely 
varying sources on what a real human social network should look like in terms of 
closeness centrality that range from 0.20 to 0.60. Therefore, for the purposes of the 
remainder of this initial experimentation D = 18.4 is used in order to target the 
fractional closeness centrality to around 0.30. The exact nature of these values is 
irrelevant for this initial model and only serves as a baseline for further work.  
4.2   Belief Revision Experimentation 
As discussed previously it is necessary to implement within the model a method for 
moderating how the agents can revise their beliefs. Initial methods for doing this are, 
at least for now, centered on a penalty for changing beliefs. 
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 ܰ݁ݐ ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀ ൌ ൫1.0 –  ܥ݋݊ݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݅݋݊൯ ൅  3.0 ݔ ܥ݋݊ݐݎܾ݅ݑݐ݅݋݊ െ ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܲ݁݊ܽݐݕ  
 
ܰ݋ݎ݈݉ܲ݁݊ܽݐݕ ൌ  ݁ிכ஻௘௟௜௘௙௏௔௥௜௔௡௖௘  
 
Where the Belief Variance is a simple Euclidean distance measure from the agents 
current beliefs to what they started with at the beginning of the simulation. What is 
surprising is that when F is varied, there is no marked difference in the outcome of the 
simulation from a purely statistical point of view. What is seen however is in the 
Public Commodity play over time. 
 
Fig. 2. Public commodity game play versus norm penalty 
The higher the factor F becomes, the more unstable the Public Commodity game 
is. In other words, with a small norm penalty the agents will tend to find a stable 
equilibrium and remain there with fairly significant stability. As F is increased, the 
stability is decreased. The intriguing thing is that this behavior appears to be similar to 
actual human interaction. For example, if we look at a society there is a sense of a 
norm although it will really change over time it will remain fairly constant over small 
enough time periods. In this society there will be people or factions that challenge the 
social norm causing brief unstable equilibrium away from the norm that seem to 
return to the social norm after some time. More investigation into this phenomenon is 
currently underway. Once there is a satisfactory explanation for this behavior it may 
be possible, just as in the second order parameter, to tune the magnitude of the norm 
penalty in a way that is unique to the society being modeled.  
5   Conclusions and Future Work 
The results of the initial work are promising in that it is seen that there are factors 
within this simple first draft model that allow the social network to form and evolve 
based purely on the agents cognitive processes however the nature of the network can 
be tuned to match a desired case. This initial effort to model trust shows a lot of 
promise and merits further investigation. The next step in this process will be to 
utilize this algorithm within an existing social simulation and evaluating the effects.   
The next generation of this model is planned to include a much more complicated 
belief structure that will include several metacognitive elements giving the agents 
some control over belief revision. There will also be included within the belief 
structure mental models of the other agents and the environment so that a perceived 
closeness in beliefs of the other agents will play directly into trust. 
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